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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a web-centered framework to in-
fer voter preferences for the 2016 U.S. presidential primaries.
Using Twitter data collected from Sept. 2015 to March 2016,
we first uncover the tweeting tactics of the candidates and
then exploit the variations in the number of ‘likes’ to in-
fer voters’ preference. With sparse learning, we are able to
reveal neutral topics as well as positive and negative ones.
Methodologically, we are able to achieve a higher pre-
dictive power with sparse learning. Substantively, we show
that for Hillary Clinton the (only) positive issue area is
women’s rights. We demonstrate that Hillary Clinton’s tac-
tic of linking herself to President Obama resonates well with
her supporters but the same is not true for Bernie Sanders.
In addition, we show that Donald Trump is a major topic for
all the other candidates, and that the women’s rights issue
is equally emphasized in Sanders’ campaign as in Clinton’s.
Lessons from the primaries can help inform the gen-
eral election and beyond. We suggest two ways that politi-
cians can use the feedback mechanism in social media to
improve their campaign: (1) use feedback from social media
to improve campaign tactics within social media; (2) for-
mulate policies and test the public response from the social
media.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Twitter is playing a significant role in connecting the pres-
idential candidates with voters [17]. Candidates increas-
ingly formulate issue policies and attack rival candidates
over Twitter. Some of the candidates’ tweets have even en-
tered into the Democratic and the Republican debates.1 Be-
tween September 18, 2015 and March 1st, 2016, Hillary Clin-
ton posted 1973 tweets, Bernie Sanders 2375 tweets, Donald
Trump 3175 tweets, Ted Cruz 1876 tweets, and Marco Ru-
bio 1333 tweets.2 These tweets constitute a valuable data
source because they are explicitly political in nature, they
are many, and, importantly, they carry feedback information
from the voters in the form of ‘likes.’
In this paper, we solve two problems. We first study the
tweeting tactics of the candidates: we analyze which polit-
ical figures are mentioned in these tweets and what issues
are raised. We then use L1-regularized negative binomial
regression to infer voters’ preference over these politicians
and issues. Our study focuses on the five major candidates
during the primaries: Hillary Clinton (D), Bernie Sanders
(D), Donald Trump (R), Ted Cruz (R), Marco Rubio (R).3
Figure 1 shall illustrate our points well. It presents three
tweets that Donald Trump (R) posted on February 9th,
2016, all of which are political in nature. The first tweet
talks about drugs. The second tweet raises the issue of
ObamaCare and points towards President Obama (D). The
third tweet is about the ISIS. Trump supporters responded
to these three tweets differently, assigning to the third tweet
the most ‘likes’ and to the second tweet the fewest ‘likes.’
By connecting topics with responses, we are therefore able
1For example, during the Democratic debate in Flint, Michi-
gan, a tweet by Bernie Sanders targeting Hillary Clinton
became the focal point. During the eleventh Republican de-
bate, Donald Trump explicitly invited the audience to check
his Twitter account.
2We do not count retweets, because retweets do not have
as a feature the number of ‘likes’ and our focus is on the
number of ‘likes’ in this work.
3The selection is based on both polling results and on the
number of delegates that each candidate has. Marco Rubio
(R) dropped out of the race on March 15th, 2016. Through-
out, we follow the convention that Republican candidates
are marked with (R) and Democratic candidates are marked
with (D).
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Figure 1: Selected tweets Donald Trump (R) posted
on February 9th.
to infer the preferences of the voters.
2. RELATEDWORK
Our work builds upon previous research in electoral stud-
ies, behavioral studies, and sparse learning.
A number of studies have found that campaign and news
media messages can alter voters’ behavior [13, 8]. Accord-
ing to Gabriel S. Lenz, public debates help inform some of
the voters about the parties’ or candidates’ positions on the
important issues [10]. In our work, we assume that tweets
posted by the presidential candidates reveal their policy po-
sitions in various dimensions and that supporters reveal their
policy preference by deciding whether or not to ‘like’ the
tweets.
There are a large body of studies on using social media
data to analyze and forecast election results. DiGrazia et
al. [3] find a statistically significant relationship between
tweets and electoral outcomes. MacWilliams [11] suggests
that a candidate’s number of ‘likes’ in Facebook can be used
for measuring a campaign’s success in engaging the pub-
lic. According to Williams and Gulati [22], the number of
Facebook fans constitutes an indicator of candidate viability.
Wang, Li and Luo [20] study the growth pattern of Donald
Trump’s followers. Gayo-Avello, Metaxas and Mustafaraj
[5] advocate that research should be accompanied with a
model explaining the predicative power, which we heed to.
Substantively, our paper is closely related to three existing
studies of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Wang, Li, and
Luo [19] use Twitter profile images to study and compare the
demographics of the followers of Donald Trump and Hillary
Clinton. Wang et. al. [18] analyze the demographic differ-
ences between the followers and unfollowers. Wang, Li, and
Luo [21] model the number of ‘likes’ that each Trump tweet
receives. Our work uses both the number of candidate fol-
lowers (as a control variable) and the number of ‘likes’, and
we study all the five major candidates rather than focus
exclusively on Donald Trump.
There are quite a few studies modeling individual behav-
iors on social media. Lee et al. [9] model the decision to
retweet, using Twitter user features such as agreeableness,
number of tweets posted, and daily tweeting patterns. Mah-
mud, Chen, and Nichols [12] model individuals’ waiting time
before replying to a tweet based on their previous replying
patterns. Wang, Li, and Luo [21] use Latent Dirichlet Al-
location (LDA) [1, 2] to extract tweet topics and model fol-
lower preferences. In this paper, we search for specific topics
using predefined keywords. Compared with LDA, the limi-
tation of our approach is that topics present in the document
all share the same weight. The advantage of our approach
is that our labels are more definitive and objective.
One of our innovations is to apply L1-regularization to
uncover neutral topics. In implementing the L1-regularized
negative binomial regression, our work borrows heavily from
[14], which introduces stochastic coordinate descent meth-
ods for LASSO [16] and for logistic regression. William
Greene [6] discusses the likelihood formulation of negative
binomial regression. Hastie et al. [7] give a very good dis-
cussion on using cross validation to select the penalty term
and on using bootstrapping to draw inferences. To the best
of our knowledge, our study is the first to implement and
apply the regularized negative binomial regression to a real
world problem.
3. DATA
We use the dataset US2016, constructed by us with Twit-
ter data.4 The dataset contains a tracking record of the
number of followers for all the major candidates in the 2016
presidential race, including Hillary Clinton (D), Bernie Sanders
(D), Donald Trump (R), Ted Cruz (R), and Marco Rubio
(R).5 The dataset spans the entire period between Septem-
ber 18th, 2015 and March 1st, 2016 and is updated every 10
minutes.
Our dataset US2016 contains all the tweets that the five
candidates posted during the same period and the number
of ‘likes’ that each tweet has received. In Table 1, we report
the summary statistics of the dependent variable: ‘likes.’
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Donald Trump 4677.911 3742.242 722 32636 3175
Ted Cruz 548.552 608.731 8 8209 1876
Marco Rubio 590.479 879.356 3 11731 1333
Hillary Clinton 1800.052 1636.849 119 19923 1973
Bernie Sanders 2979.268 2966.524 204 57635 2375
We refer to these ‘likes’ as tallies and, in line with [11],
we assume that the more likes the better. To visualize these
tallies, we plot the density distribution for each candidate,
grouped by party affiliation. We align the x axis so that it
is easy to compare the distribution both across candidates
and across parties. We observe that in the Democratic party,
Sanders’ tweets tend to receive more ‘likes’ than Clinton’s
tweets. Among Republican candidates, Trump’s tweets re-
ceive more ‘likes’ than Cruz and Rubio. Equally important,
4Some of the studies based on this dataset include [21, 20,
19].
5Eleven other candidates, including John Kasich (R) and
Martin O’Malley (D), are also included in the dataset.
we observe large variations in the distribution for all candi-
dates.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Likes in Log Units
We believe part of the variations can be attributed to the
topics embedded in the tweets: a more preferred topic gener-
ates more ‘likes.’ To operationalize this idea, we first multi-
label each tweet for the following individual-based topics:
President Obama (D), Hillary Clinton (D), Bernie Sanders
(D), Martin O’Malley (D), Donald Trump (R), Ted Cruz
(R), Marco Rubio (R), Jeb Bush (R), Ben Carson (R), Rand
Paul (R), John Kasich (R), and Chris Christie (R).6 We then
multi-label each tweet for issue-based topics: ISIS, immigra-
tion, Iran, women’s rights, education, drugs, gun control,
abortion, economy and the Wall Street.7
Topic features are binary. We derive these features using
keyword matching. For example, we assign to the Obama
topic 1 for tweets that contain “Obama” and assign 1 to
the Rubio topic for tweets containing “marcorubio” (case-
sensitive) or “Rubio.” For issue topics, we first transform
the tweets to lowercase before the matching procedure. For
example, we assign 1 to the abortion topic for tweets that
either contain “abortion” or “planned parenthood.”
In addition to topic feature variables, we control for the
number of followers, the length of the tweet (after removing
stop words), and whether or not the tweet contains an http
link. In Figure 3, we report time-series follower data for all
the five candidates during the primaries. One immediate
observation is that Hillary Clinton (D) and Donald Trump
(R) dominate their respective party in terms of Twitter fol-
lowers.
6By the end of the New Hampshire primary, Martin
O’Malley, Rand Paul, and Chris Christie have quit the race.
7The selection of political figures is based on the
poll performance. For poll data, please refer to
http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster#2016-
primaries. The selection of political issues fol-
lows the Bing Political Index. Available at
https://blogs.bing.com/search/2015/12/08/the-bing-2016-
election-experience-how-do-the-candidates-measure-up.
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Figure 3: Number of Followers of the Candidates,
from September 2015 to March 2016.
4. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first report on how we formulate our
problem as an L1 regularized loss minimization problem and
then we detail the coordinate descent algorithm for solving
the problem, and the parameter selection procedure.
4.1 Model Formulation
Our problem starts as a standard negative binomial re-
gression problem, linking the number of ‘likes’, which is
count data, to the explanatory topics. In this regression,
the conditional likelihood of the number of ‘likes’, yj , is for-
mulated as
f(yj |vj) = (vjµj)
yj e−vjµj
Γ(yj + 1)
where µj = exp(xjβ) is the link function that connects
our topics to the number of ‘likes’ in the tweets and vi is a
hidden variable with a Gamma( 1
α
, α) distribution.8 After
plugging in the topic variables, the loss function, which is
the negative unconditional log-likelihood of the ‘likes’ takes
the form:
L = −
N∑
j=1
[ln(Γ(m+ yj)− ln(Γ(yj + 1))− ln(Γ(m))
+ mln(pj) + yj ln(1− pj)]
p = 1/(1 + αµ)
m = 1/α
µ = exp(β0 + β1Follower Count + β2Tweet Length
+ β3Hyperlink + β4Self Referencing
+ β4 ·Political Figures + β5 ·Political Issues)
where α is the over-dispersion parameter and will be
8For a detailed introduction to the formulation of the nega-
tive binomial likelihood, please see [15, 6].
estimated as well. Now we combine loss L with a penalty
for the L1 norm of the coefficients β and arrive at the final
formulation of our optimization problem.
min
β,α
L(α, 〈β,X〉,Y) + λ||β ||1
4.2 Coordinate Descent Algorithm
Solving this minimization problem using coordinate de-
scent, we first calculate the derivative of L with respective
to β and log(α) as follows:9
∂L
∂βi
= −
N∑
j=1
[(yi −m) 1
1 + αµj
µjxi +
yj
µj
µjxi]
∂L
∂ln(α)
= −
N∑
j=1
[
1
α2
(ψ(m)− ψ(m+ yj)− ln(pj))
+ [−(m+ yj) 1
1 + αµj
µj +
yj
α
]]α
where ψ(x) is the digamma function, ψ(x) := ∂ln(Γ(x))
∂x
.
We apply regularization to all the independent variables
but not to the over-dispersion parameter α. Our coordinate
descent algorithm is detailed as follows:
Algorithm: Coordinate Descent for L1 Regularized Nega-
tive Binomial10
## p: number of features, η: learning rate;
let β=1 ∈ Rp, α = 1 ∈ R, η = 0.002
for iter=1,2,...N do
for i=1,2, ..,p do
L′i =
∂L
∂βi
if βi − ηL′ > ηλ:
βi ← βi − ηL′ − ηλ
else if βi − ηL′ < −ηλ:
βi ← βi − ηL′ + ηλ
else:
βi ← 0
end for
L′α=
∂L
ln(α)
ln(α)← ln(α)-ηln′α
α← eln(α)
end for
4.3 Model Selection
Following suggestions in [7], we use cross validation to
select the penalty term and the model. Specifically, we use
5-fold cross validation, i.e. iteratively 20% of the dataset
is held out for validation, to select λCV that minimizes the
averaged mean squared prediction error (MSE):
MSE =
1
N
j=N∑
j=1
(yj − exj bˆ)2
9We calculate the derivative of L with respect to log(α) in-
stead of α to ensure that α stays positive throughout the
optimization procedure.
10We have posted our codes at
http://sites.google.com/site/wangyurochester.
where yj is the true number of ‘likes’ for the j th tweet and
exj bˆ is the model’s prediction.
When λCV equals zero, i.e. no penalty, our model is equiv-
alent to the standard negative binomial regression, so we
treat the λCV = 0 as the baseline model.
11 We report the
cross validation error curve in Figure IV. Based on cross
validation and the MSE metric, the model we use for later
point estimation and inference yields the highest predictive
power.
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Figure 4: Penalty Selection for Each Presidential
Candidate
In drawing inferences on β’s distribution, we use 1,000
bootstrap realizations of βˆλcv [4]. The detailed results are
reported in Section 5.
11When the penalty term is zero, our results are identical to
the standard outputs from Stata (http://www.stata.com)
and R.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present our main findings. We first re-
port on the candidates’ tweeting tactics and then on our es-
timation of voters’ preference. Our presentation and discus-
sion will focus mainly on Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump
as they have won the presidential nomination of their respec-
tive party and will compete against each other in the general
election.
5.1 Tactics
In Figure 5, we report on the frequency with which each
of the political figures has been mentioned by the Demo-
cratic candidates.12 We find Clinton focuses mostly on Don-
ald Trump (R) and President Obama (D) and that Bernie
Sanders focuses on Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Their
varied emphasis on President Obama is consistent with the
view that Hillary Clinton has the implicit backing from the
President.
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Figure 5: Political Figures Mentioned by Hillary
Clinton and Bernie Sanders.
In Figure 6, we report on the frequency that each of the
political figures has been mentioned by the Republican can-
didates. We find Trump focuses mostly on Ted Cruz (R), Jeb
Bush (R) and Hillary Clinton (D). Cruz focuses on Donald
Trump, President Obama and Hillary Clinton. Marco Ru-
bio focuses almost exclusively on the Democrats: President
Obama and Hillary Clinton.
In Figure 7, we report on the distribution of policy is-
sues for the Democratic candidates. We observe that Hillary
Clinton focuses heavily on women’s rights issue and on gun
control, while Sanders talks about the economy and attacks
the Wall Street the most.
In Figure 8, we report on the distribution of policy is-
sues for the Republican candidates. Compared with the
Democrats, the Republicans focus more on foreign policies:
ISIS, immigration and Iran and less on domestic issues. For
Donald Trump, the most prominent issue is immigration.
5.2 Voter Preference
In this section, we present our estimation of voters’ prefer-
ences. We obtain the penalty terms for each candidate using
12We do not count self-referencing in our calculation, i.e.,
Clinton is not considered a political topic for Clinton herself.
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Figure 6: Political Figures Mentioned by Trump,
Cruz and Rubio.
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Figure 7: Policy Issues Raised by Hillary Clinton
and Bernie Sanders.
5-fold cross validation. We use bootstrapping to calculate
the standard errors for each topic coefficient. The distribu-
tions of the coefficients for each candidate are reported at
the end of the paper (Figure 9 - Figure 13).
We report the estimated coefficients for Donald Trump
in the first column of Table 2. We find that Trump receives
more ‘likes’ when he attacks Democrats and fewer ‘likes’ if he
attacks fellow Republicans. This is consistent with the find-
ings reported in [21], which uses unsupervised LDA. Trump
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Figure 8: Policy Issues Raised by Trump, Cruz and
Rubio.
is also particularly strong on ISIS. Due to regularization,
Rand Paul (R) and abortion prove to be neutral topics.
By contrast, Hillary Clinton, reported in the last column
of Table 2, clearly benefits from her association with Presi-
dent Obama. Clinton receives more ‘likes’ on women’s rights
and fewer ‘likes’ on the economy and on Wall Street. The
penalty term for Clinton (0.0017) is larger than that for
Trump (0.00055). As a result, more coefficients for Hillary
Clinton turn out to be zeros.
For Ted Cruz (R), he receives more ‘likes’ when attacking
Hillary Clinton (D) and Donald Trump (R). The coefficients
for other political figures are either zero or not significant. In
issue areas, Cruz is strong on ISIS but not others. For Marco
Rubio (R), the only two topics that earn him more ‘likes’ are
Donald Trump and ISIS. His attacks on President Obama
and Hillary Clinton do not resonate with his supporters very
well. Bernie Sanders (D) is known as the candidate calling
for a political revolution, and the preferences of his voters
do show peculiarity.
We observe that Sanders is the only candidate who re-
ceives more ‘likes’ in the area of education and fewer ‘likes’
on immigration.13 This is consistent with the candidate’s
policies: Sanders is the first candidate to propose free college
education (which Clinton has copied later), and Sanders,
whose father immigrated from Poland, supports a path to
U.S. citizenship for the undocumented immigrants.
Focusing on the parties, we observe that the Republicans
13For a review of Sanders’ rise and
his proposed policies, please see
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/opinion/sunday/the-
bernie-sanders-revolution.html.
Table 2: L1 Regularized Negative Binomial Regres-
sion
Trump Cruz Rubio Sanders Clinton
Likes
Constant -2.068** -1.791** -2.111** 0.810** 0.000
(0.105) (0.088) (0.13) (0.106) (0.167)
Followers 6.532** 6.653** 5.793** 3.828** 1.787**
(0.176) (0.315) (0.598) (0.731) (0.333)
Length 0.131** 0.454** 0.514** 0.000 -0.052
(0.022) (0.045) (0.086) (0.039) (0.049)
Http 0.097** 0.143 0.134 -0.417** -0.171**
(0.024) (0.079) (0.118) (0.045) (0.045)
Obama 0.386** 0.073 -0.127 0.000 0.445**
(0.09) (0.086) (0.078) (0.045) (0.186)
Clinton 0.236** 0.698** 0.057 0.225 -0.378**
(0.046) (0.332) (0.079) (0.126) (0.037)
Sanders 0.122 0.000 0.319 0.128
(0.126) (0.095) (0.215) (0.14)
Omalley 0.253 0.000
(0.164) (0.0)
Trump -0.311** 0.789** 1.704** 0.961** 0.336
(0.022) (0.14) (0.19) (0.145) (0.196)
Cruz -0.098** -0.307** 0.210 0.000
(0.037) (0.047) (0.413) (0.009)
Jeb -0.085** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.036) (0.212) (0.142) (0.0) (0.009)
Carson -0.073 0.169 0.000 0.185 0.000
(0.058) (0.248) (0.241) (0.326) (0.007)
Rand 0.000
(0.087)
Rubio -0.072 0.345 -0.560** 0.000 0.000
(0.042) (0.277) (0.221) (0.218) (0.055)
Kasich -0.048 0.000 0.000
(0.068) (0.141) (0.123)
Christie -0.007
(0.184)
ISIS 0.414** 0.306** 0.725** 0.000 0.000
(0.098) (0.095) (0.231) (0.025) (0.051)
Immigration 0.111 -0.053 0.000 -0.257** -0.045
(0.092) (0.123) (0.108) (0.071) (0.086)
Iran 0.089 -0.105 0.000 0.000
(0.106) (0.123) (0.04) (—) (0.118)
Women’s rights -0.008 0.060 0.000 0.389** 0.176**
(0.094) (0.172) (0.051) (0.083) (0.058)
Education 0.382 -0.090 0.000 0.221** 0.000
(0.33) (0.157) (0.036) (0.062) (0.083)
Drugs 0.012 0.000 0.000
(0.261) (0.066) (0.081)
Gun Control 0.571 0.000 0.000 0.468 0.018
(0.292) (0.075) (0.044) (0.297) (0.071)
Abortion 0.000 0.276 0.235 0.047
(0.103) (0.224) (0.149) (0.07)
Economy 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.253** -0.229**
(0.056) (0.097) (0.043) (0.048) (0.071)
Wall Street -0.348 0.000 -0.080 -0.330**
(0.185) (0.065) (0.058) (0.074)
α 0.0700 0.0016 0.0274 0.0708 0.1930
λ 0.00055 0.00065 0.00155 0.0018 0.0017
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗ p < 0.05
Zero coefficients in bold.
benefit from their position on ISIS, while ISIS is a neutral
topic for the Democrats. The women’s rights issue wins
Democratic candidates more ‘likes,’ but it is neutral for the
Republicans. The economy is apparently hurting the Demo-
cratic candidates but not the three Republican candidates.
The results also show that voters do not like to see candi-
dates attack fellow party members.
For the control variables, we observe that the more follow-
ers one has the more ‘likes’ one receives, which is intuitive.
In terms of the length of the tweets, we find that longer
tweets tend to help Republicans win more ‘likes,’ but not so
for the Democrats. Lastly, tweets with a hyperlink tend to
receive more ‘likes’ for Donald Trump. The opposite is true
for the Democrats.14
Lastly, we emphasize that our regularized negative bino-
mial regression outperforms the standard negative binomial,
i.e. with no penalty terms, in two dimensions. First, we are
able to achieve a smaller prediction error, which can be seen
in Figure 4. Second, interpretation of the results is made
substantially easier as many (33, to be specific) of the co-
efficients have shrunk to zero. As a result, campaigns are
better able to focus on the winning issues.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Twitter is playing an important role in connecting presi-
dential candidates and potential voters through the tweet-
ing and ‘likes’ channels. In this paper, we have proposed a
framework to infer voter preferences via this feedback mech-
anism. Using Twitter data collected from September 2015
to March 2016, we first uncovered the tweeting tactics of
the candidates and then we exploited the variations in the
number of ‘likes’ to infer voters’ preference. Besides posi-
tive and negative topics, we were also able to reveal neutral
topics with sparse learning.
Methodologically, we were able to achieve a higher predic-
tive power with sparse learning. Substantively, we showed
that for Hillary Clinton the (only) positive issue area is
women’s rights. We demonstrated that Hillary Clinton’s tac-
tic of linking herself to President Obama resonates well with
her supporters but the same is not true for Bernie Sanders.
In addition, we showed that Donald Trump is a major topic
for all the other candidates and that the women’s rights issue
is equally emphasized in Sanders’ campaign as in Clinton’s.
Lessons from the primaries can help inform the general
election and beyond. We suggest two ways that politicians
could use the feedback mechanism in social media and more
generally on the web to improve their campaign: (1) use
feedback from social media to improve campaign tactics
within social media; (2) formulate policies and test the pub-
lic response from the social media.
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